# 1NC

## 1NC — Off

### 1NC — T

#### Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend an expansion of the scope of the United States’ core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

Lisa Kimmel 20, Senior Counsel at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C., twenty years of experience as an antitrust lawyer and holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley; and Eric Fanchiang, associate in Crowell & Moring’s Irvine, CA office and a member of the firm’s antitrust and commercial litigation groups, 2020, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property Licensing,” in 2020 Licensing Update, Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate because each of the above words require governmental action

#### Vote negative — 3 impacts —

#### 1 — Fairness — forced winner-loser nature means debate is a game — the aff has a strategic incentive to stray from the resolution — that makes research impossible, discourages argumentative innovation, and turns accessibility — accesses the terminal impact to the activity.

#### 2 — Clash — they incentivise defense of unanswerable positions and monopolization of moral high ground — denies a role for the neg and transforms debate into a lecture — that destroys rigorous testing, advocacy, and research skills — turns their advocacy and precludes every intrinsic benefit to debate.

#### 3 — Topic Education — policy debates over antitrust are valuable

Waller & Morse 20, \*John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law; Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law \*\*J.D. Expected 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (\*Spencer Weber Waller \*\*Jacob Morse, 7-26-2020, "The Political Face of Antitrust," Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660946)

IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139

Conclusion

Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

#### Switch side debate solves their offense — it’s the greatest internal link to advocacy skills and the most reflexive version of the topic.

### 1NC — K

#### The affirmative’s reliance on mathematics is part and parcel with capitalist exploitation and ensures their method will be trapped within the university — also, their use of math turns the aff through obliterating subjectivity and enforcing commodification

Pais ’19 — Alexandre Pais (Faculty of Education, Manchester Metropolitan University); “Mathematics, capitalism, and biosocial research;” SpringerLink; Educational Studies in Mathematics, 101, 373-386, 2019; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7

Schmidt’s statement above is a sign of the “knowledge society” we live in today. It presupposes a society where everybody follows the letter of the Law, a complete society where there is no place for “misbehaviours”. You should only do what is supposed to be known. In the horizon lies the idea of a total society—each one in her or his own place, causing no friction, no alarm, doing only what the other knows. Mathematics, in particular, presents an exemplary case of science and society’s dreams of totality, in the way it seeks in its endeavours to tame the subject of its investigations. It is this untamed student—that talks, screws teacher’s plans, refuses to learn, etc.—that becomes obliterated in biosocial research (and, for that matter, also in the great majority of mathematics education research, see Pais and Valero ([2012](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR43))). In this article, I argued that this obliteration is already at play as a real abstraction in the capitalist mode of production (Sohn-Rethel, [1978](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR46)). Something happens in the daily life of people that makes them prone not to consider such an un-sutured subject.

This negativity of the subject (and the truth that encompasses it, see Pais, [2017b](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR42)) thwarts any endeavours to completely map subjectivity. This feature is not dear to capitalist mechanics, which requires an increasing codification (commoditization) of reality in order to thrive. Nothing can be outside the radar of capital’s movement. Mathematics, being the archetypical case of a fly-by-wire science (Laurent, [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR27), p. 30)—that is, of a science where significant efforts are made to obliterate any traces of subjectivity—is concomitant with the capitalist drive towards automation and totality. In capitalism, all is possible, as long as it is registered within the space of commodity exchange. A person becomes possible from the moment it can be registered. It is easier to “register” a person through quantification (including biodata) than through speech—after all, while biodata can be quite aseptic and “analysable”, people’s speech is often incoherent, contradictory and muddled. As mentioned by de Freitas ([2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR11)), “[l]ived experience becomes unrecognizable in a world of microtemporal biometric data that circulates and is absorbed at rates well below and above the bandwidth of human consciousness” (p. 303). Biometric data thus seems to offer a swift way to bypass human life for the sake of capitalism. As said before, capitalism works better without humans. Perhaps this explains the success that more than human theories are experiencing today.

My plea is not to reject the relevant insights that biosocial research and new materialism bring into mathematics education. I am also for “a curriculum that was less concerned with procedures and more with creativity” (de Freitas & Sinclair, [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR12), p. 466) providing students with the opportunity “to engage with the new virtual spaces” of concepts (de Freitas & Sinclair, [2014](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR13), p. 54), for the reanimation of “ossified mathematics concepts” (p. 213), or rethinking learning as “an indeterminate act of assembling various kinds of agencies rather than a trajectory that ends in the acquiring of fixed objects of knowledge?” (p. 52). In thought, one cannot but agree with these ideas (which are not entirely new). The problem arises when one starts to think about the concrete circumstances that need to be met so that these thoughtful changes can actually become a classroom reality. We know well how mathematics education research tends to create a picture of school mathematics at odds with the reality of schools, and how its results have little impact on schools (e.g., Klette, [2004](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR24); Lerman, [2014](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR30)). To ask the question of actualisation implies confronting the research discourse with the real of schools (Pais, [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10649-018-9859-7#ref-CR40)). While the former is (usually) rational, schools’ organisation tends to be “irrational” and against teachers and researchers’ better knowledge. As I have been exploring in my work, I suggest that it is only by positing schools against the background of capitalist economics that one can understand this resistance to change. It is the fact that schools need to produce failure that colours many of the students’ difficulties usually identified by the research community as “cognitive”, “sociocultural” or “more than human” impediments. In short, I am pleading for the return of the primacy of the economy, not to disregard all the important insights of research around the postmodern and new materialist concerns, but precisely in order to create the conditions for the more effective realisation of them.

#### The impacts are resource wars, climate change, structural violence, and extinction — equitable governance structures are key

Parr, philosophy PhD, 15 (Adrian Parr – PhD in Philosophy @ Monash University, professor at the Institute of Critical Philosophy, UNESCO Co-Chair of Water Access and Sustainability. “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” June 2015, *Geoforum*, Volume 62, Pages 70-72)

In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ ( Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013 and Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability ( Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.

**only a vertical form of organization aimed at transformation of constituted structures of power can actualize change**

**Dean and Mertz ‘16** (Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/)

CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point. The Tea Party took the Republican Party as its target. They decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system by getting people elected and basically by trying to take over part of government. That’s why they were able to have good effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize.¶ The problem with many—but not all—leftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it, and **leave it altogether**. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and too much of the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and **disperse and become fragmented**.¶ CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD: There are multiple things. First, the fear of success: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. Where Communist and socialist parties “succeeded,” there was violence and purges and repression. One reason the left has turned its back is because of this historical experience of state socialism. And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn.¶ Another reason that the left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. **Those criticisms are real.** **But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive** and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality?¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and critical of collectivity. But I think **that’s just a capitalist sellout**. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just **going in the direction of the dominant culture**. That is actually not a left position at all.¶ CM: So does identity politics undermine collectivism? And did that end up leading to fragmentation and a weakening of the left? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences. That has to be addressed on the left, and the left has been addressing that. But we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. **Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism**. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “**No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?**”¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD: We can think about the Black Panther Party as a neat example in the US context: A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to galvanize social power. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶ Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though political parties are, historically, forms that do that, that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case.¶ And one more thing: there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. That has to change. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the rhetorics of consensus and horizontalism, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual, their interests, their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that **people** start **look**ing **for how their exact experiences** and interests **are not being recognized**.¶ I think that the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual. That’s a liberal assumption. Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that politics begins in groups. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class. Class is what determines where our political interests come from.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book to dismantle the assumption that politics, particularly left politics, should begin with the individual. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist Party again as a force—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but the goal isn’t just being elected. **The goal is overthrowing capitalism**. The goal is **being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles**.¶ Second, it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. But I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism: every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that the countries we understand to have been ruled by Communist Parties were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves. We can say that state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶ When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, it’s not a political statement. Even at a march (fully permitted) that’s registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq, for example, or concern about the climate—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count.¶ But the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more. We want actual equality. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party.¶ I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD: Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone. What this narrative did was produce the divided collectivity that we need. It’s great to undermine the ~~stupid~~ myth of American unity, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: **an antagonistic one**.

## 1NC — Case

### 1NC — Parametrics

#### Interpretation – the aff should have to defend a parametricization of their method

#### Violation – the aff only discusses issues with existing scholarship without proposing an alternative or defending an alternative system of knowledge- even if they do, they need to defend a particular context where that method should be applied.

#### Vote neg—

#### 1—Aff conditionality. Absent defense of a specific advocacy the aff can shift their interpretation of their argument in every speech to dodge method criticisms, counter-methods and impact turns to their understanding of scholarship. A moving target affirmative makes all of their truth claims falsifiable, which replicates the form of hegemonic knowledge production they criticize

#### 2—Neg ground. There’s not any robust defense to a broad conceptualization of an abstract method. All the best responses are in the context of particularized discussion. Even if the aff is correct about the way that liberal democracy scholarship works, how should we change it, who should we give aid to, what does that mean for policy? Those are questions the negative can contest – lack of clear point of contestation makes it impossible to be negative and undermines in-depth clash. That turns the aff – without deliberative engagement in the form of clash, hierarchical dominance and exclusion are more likely. It also means their aff isn’t subjected to rigorous scrutiny to determine if it’s a good form of epistemology or best critique of liberal democracy.

#### It’s a voter for fairness and education.

### 1NC — Turn

#### The affirmative allies with anti-humanism.

Brennan, 17—Professor of comparative literature, cultural studies, and English at the University of Minnesota (Timothy, “Introduction,” *For Humanism: Explorations in Theory and Politics*, Introduction, pg 1-7, dml)

To say that humans create is, of course, to say they can. And that means that they are free, have agency and can do what they have not done in the past regardless of, or rather because of, their nature. Logically, then, transformation is possible and the future open. Humanists do not believe humans are the only species that matters, only that it is impossible for any species to think outside the limits of its own being -- a view that does not preclude ethical behaviour towards other species or respect for the natural environment. As Ludwig Feuerbach puts it in The Essence of Christianity (1841), ‘If God were an object to the bird, he would be an object to it only as a winged being -- the bird knows nothing higher, nothing more blissful than the state of being winged.’1 Following from this, the humanist contends that every human, qua human, shares universal attributes -- a vital tenet so that no one can be relegated to a subspecies or denied membership in humanity on the grounds of his or her particularities.

The body of ideas called humanism was never just a set of beliefs but a collection of contrarian intellectual practices. We are talking not only of positions but methods and habits of thinking. This aspect has been largely lost in the post-war flight from humanism so vigorously adduced in the pages of the present volume. It grew out of a body of study we today call the humanities, and the current attacks on the humanities can, to that degree, be seen as evidence of our culture’s mainstream antihumanism.

We should remember that humanism’s early exponents -- in China and the Arabic world, not only Europe -- all expressed their view in the form of a project of training in the liberal arts (expressed in the West as humanitas or paideia), and so we are talking about a revolution in learning based on the study of books, especially the forgotten wisdom of the past, just as the present volume (we might notice) -- For Humanism -- is involved in a similar recovery. Despite my just quoting Latin and Greek, the contributions to humanism are universal -- a view that is frequently denied today. They can be found in the agnosticism, scepticism towards the supernatural, and emphasis on human choice and agency found within strains of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and Zoroastrianism.

As I have just laid them out, these foundations are obscured today for a number of reasons, and they contribute greatly to the confusion. For one thing, our historical moment is a uniquely disorienting one. Biotechnology obviates the long-standing debate over human nature by threatening to invent a new one according to a managerial plan. Venture capitalists declare openly that if yesterday’s economic game-changer was 0’s and 1’s, today’s are A’s, G’s, T’s and C’s -- the bases of DNA. The classic question of what the human being is, then, has been gamed by forces that seek to control it to a degree unknown in any other historical period -- picking up where the twentieth century’s innovations in this regard left off: the manipulation of libidinal drives by the commercial media and the merciless incantation of official ‘news’ in the major Western countries which has, many argue, short-circuited mental capacities. Between the managed emotions of overprescribed antidepressants and social media fixations (Twitter, Facebook) that blur the distinction between free time and advertising, how could it be otherwise than that coercion would be widely mistaken for freedom, and submission for resistance? What is Right and what is Left is no longer clear -- and that more than any other point defines the current humanism debate.

For Humanism is for that reason very well timed, and also for that reason apparently untimely -- as though holding on to ideas with a warm heart and unstifled hopes to prolong a dead (if sorely missed) historical moment of socialist internationalism. Again, our moment is unique. For it is only in the last four decades that attacks on humanism -- until then, the standard-issue views of apologists of religious absolutism, Church censors and the reactionary wings of modernism -- have been thought politically progressive. In fact, the lineages of antihumanist thought have always been aligned with aristocratic or theocratic privileges; or they assumed the form of apocalyptic amoralism for which the (equally aristocratic) Marquis de Sade is usually the emblem. It was de Sade, in fact, who by way of Georges Bataille helped bring antihumanism into post-war theory and made it a model of failed gods, sexual desire and a mockery of progress.2 It made people associate radical opposition with transgression and the non-normative rather than with social transformation -- a realm explored in the illuminatingly revisionist chapter on the politics of gender and sexual desire by David Alderson in the present volume.

What For Humanism returns to, by contrast -- these rich if now neglected mid-twentieth-century narratives of dissident humanism in figures like Karel Kosík, Jean-Paul Sartre, Raya Dunayevaska and the Yugoslavian Praxis group -- is part of a wider historical arc than the recent form of the debate would have us think. This volume’s genealogies remind us just how much theory in recent decades represents an idiosyncratic detour. It is true, as theory had charged, that humanism may have been enlisted as a slogan of capital in its nineteenth-century colonial form -- the technocratic fetish of managerial progress whose ‘dialectic’ Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer sceptically diagnosed mid-century -- but this was overall a co-optation. More typically it was the groundwork of antinomians, visionaries and iconoclasts.3 In this volume, Kevin Anderson describes how on the very heels of proclaiming existentialism a humanism, Jean-Paul Sartre distinguished himself from the ‘liberal and republican humanism’ that was theory’s real and only target. The ledgers of humanism abound, Anderson implies, with just the opposite: struggles against religious dogma, ideas imported from other cultures in order to curb ethnocentrism, and intellectual life brought face to face with politics so that reality might be thought something less to observe than make.

The case against humanism in the post-war period would have us think of humanism in terms of an exclusivist rhetoric of innate qualities and character found in figures like David Hume, Jeremy Bentham and Napoleon III. Historically, though, humanism belongs much more to the maverick secularity of Thales and Anaxagoras, the philological study of Roman law in Varro, the preservation of Oriental learning in the Islamic Golden age (Averroes, Avicenna), the great rediscovery of Egypt in Neoplatonism, the creation by scholasticism of the first European universities, the madrasas of the Maghreb and the Levant, and the triumph of reading in the Italian renaissance of Poggio Bracciolini and Erasmus, the great philological sociologies of ibn Khaldun and later, in an identical spirit, Giambattista Vico. The humanism of the French Revolution and, in its wake, the young-Hegelians, especially Ludwig Feuerbach and Marx, is usually staged as a radical fissure in history or a lamentable march down a dead end historical lane. And yet, left Hegelianism (including Marx) is only the continuation of a spirit of learning, of vernacular inclusiveness and political renovation that had preceded them in Eastern and Western antiquity.

It may be even more of a challenge to the idiosyncratic reigning story of recent decades to recall that the intellectual leaders of anticolonialism after World War II deployed humanist motifs consistently and very consciously. Edward Said’s well-known rallying to the cause of humanism (against the stream of theory) grew out of a broader understanding of the scholarship of George Makdisi on the Arabic contributions to humanism and to the revolutionary solidarities of his close friends Eqbal Ahmad and Mahmoud Darwish. He often illustrates those commitments, in fact, by quoting Aimé Césaire’s Notebook on a Return to my Native Land, where the poet reclaims the essential humanity of actors, black and white, on either side of the colonial divide at the ‘rendezvous of victory’, and bitterly satirises the antihumanist doctrines guiding a colonial enterprise propped up, as he puts it in Discourse on Colonialism, by ‘chattering intellectuals born stinking out of the thigh of Nietzsche’.4

John Dewey’s pragmatism took shape as an effort to reverse the nativism and racial panic of early twentieth-century anti-immigration trends, just as the Brahmo Samaj of Tagore and others in West Bengal set out to secularise the Hindu Right at the dawn of the Indian independence movements. M. N. Roy, the co-founder of the Mexican Communist Party, and a Bengali revolutionary who collaborated with Lenin on the writing of his ‘Theses on the National Question’, spent the final decades of his life building a movement tied to an Institute at Dehradun on behalf of what he called ‘a cultural-educational organization founded with the object of re-educating the educators and young intellectuals of India in spirit and with the ideas of Radical (or Integral) Humanism’.5 By the 1950s, humanism was for Roy the logical, secular, extra-party version of interwar Marxism.

So the very point of departure of antihumanism is politically vexed. To join its forces is to reject much more than hypocritical Eurocentric philosophies of ‘progress’ or imperious universals moulded in the image of Western males. It is rather to assault a centuries-long heritage of resistance and renovation. The symbolism, then, of the appearance of the locus classicus of post-war antihumanist thought, Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947), is notable, since it coincided almost exactly with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) -- the most far-reaching practical statement of humanist convictions published in the century, and not coincidentally composed by UN delegates from Egypt, Chile, India and other former colonies. The two texts stand as mid-century antipodes -- the former arguing that ‘Man [sic]’ cannot attain his proper ‘dignity’ under humanism since the latter relies on a system of logic and values that prove powerless to capture the plenitude of being; the latter, codifying the universal protections necessary to safeguard human subjects whose particularities vis-à-vis European and American norms had deprived them of the right to well-being, freedom and autonomy. The nature of antihumanism’s complaint, though, is not exhausted by these examples, and becomes more evident in the observation that humanism defined itself as an embrace of learning, literature and the book traditionally associated with philology.6 Since the ‘theory’ invoked in the subtitle of this volume grew out of an extreme position on language as grammatically fixed -- to written as opposed to spoken language -- we can begin to appreciate the motives of this peculiar philosophical demarche. Heidegger’s representative move in ‘Letter on Humanism’, in another flipping of the script, only appears to protest this tyranny when he appeals to ‘the liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential framework ... reserved for thought and poetic creation’. The freedom he has in mind is not the inventiveness of a vernacular speech making new rules but a freedom from ‘the dictatorship of the public realm’, returning language to ‘the house of being’ -- that is, to see the communicative and expressive means on which all debate, discussion and sociality depends as being not about meaning or intention but a kind of medium within which the artist-thinker dwells.7

Heidegger’s famous declaration that language speaks Man rather than the other way around was one of the many ideas interwar phenomenology derived from Nietzsche, although, as Barbara Epstein crucially observes in this volume, figures like Maurice Merleau-Ponty (an important early influence on Said) and Sartre reappropriated aspects of phenomenology for humanist thought. And yet, in the end all modern antihumanism is Nietzschean, expanding on or adapting his philosophy’s central principles that free choice is an illusion; that knowledge, even if it were possible, has no ‘use’; that ethics constrain Man’s life-enhancing instincts; and that ‘truth’ is rhetorical, language a means of artful deception. Lying, states Nietzsche unequivocally, gives humans their evolutionary advantage over other animals. A professional philologist, Nietzsche’s revolt was precisely aimed at his own earlier training in the humanist tradition of letters with which he had grown disaffected. Not learning but art, creative illusion, are the dignity of Man for him; not making life anew but coming to admit what we are: unequal, visceral.

It is not going too far to say that understanding the contemporary recoil from humanism is impossible without becoming familiar with Nietzsche’s thought. Antihumanism derives from him more than from any other source -- idea for idea, word for word. It is Bataille who in the late 1940s enshrines Nietzsche, announcing that ‘Nietzsche’s position is the only one apart from communism’,8 and whose fealty goes so far that he considers himself ‘the same as he’. Foucault’s and Deleuze’s later efforts to claim Nietzsche for the radical Left are taken very directly, although without acknowledgement, from Bataille’s earlier experiments in appropriating the language of the Hegelian Left for the purpose of destroying it from within. Bataille redeploys Hegelian terms like ‘totality’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘negation’ on behalf of a human subject forced to reckon with its instinctive cruelty, its amoralism and its illusory subjectivity. Foucault’s ‘death of the subject’ and Deleuze’s ‘pure immanence’ are both echoes of Bataille’s already perfected gestures.

Antihumanism, nevertheless, passed through various phases.9 Anthropological antihumanism, to take a fascinating and little-known example, was a dominant aspect of culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, harmonising with aspects of Nietzsche’s critique. Loudly charging academic humanism with enshrining the ‘positivist, ratiocinating West’ and excluding Africans and Asians from the human as such, an insurgent anthropology arose with a counter-method that was both intellectually appealing and commercially viable. It appeared radical to many at first, producing a large number of popular museum exhibitions and pamphlets: ‘Rather than excluding the colonised other, anthropology would focus explicitly on societies that, all agreed, were radically separate from narratives of Western civilisation. Instead of studying European “cultural peoples” (Kulturvölker), societies defined by their history and civilisation, anthropologists studied the colonised “natural peoples” (Naturvölker).’10

As a populist discourse with the aim of displacing academic mandarins, anthropology promised Germans that they could reinvent themselves along the lines of the country’s new imperial ambitions. The conquest of foreign territories provided antihumanism with its ‘ethnographic performers, artifacts, body parts, and field sites that provided the empirical data’ and so linked the imperial, the natural, and the German in a style of thought that led directly to theories of ‘racial hygiene’.11 One particularly well-known anthropologist, Leo Frobenius, argued that ‘Germans like Africans were people of emotion, intuitive reason, art, poetry, image, and myth’, thereby establishing an antihumanist affinity with the peripheral subaltern that had the great merit of making Germanness unique within the family of Europe.12 A neo-Orientalist theory of absolute cultural and mental otherness, then, could portray itself as an insurrectionary ideology -- a minority tendency reclaiming ‘difference’ for use against the establishment.

#### The lens of human commonality prevents extinction.

Al-Nakib, 19—associate professor of postcolonial studies and comparative literature at Kuwait University (Mai, “Finding Common Cause,” Interventions, August 5, 2019, dml)

It is the beginning of Spivak’s planetarity (2003, 72) and Gilroy’s planetary humanism (2005, 4). To become “planetary subjects rather than global agents” involves reckoning with the planet as alterity, as an impossible other, and -- always at the same time -- as a part of ourselves (Spivak 2003, 73). As Spivak explains: “The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan” (72). Planetarity -- whether in the practice of comparative literary scholarship, pedagogy, or (especially) ethical and ecological living -- transgresses normative oppositions (outer--inner, continuous--discontinuous) coextensive with capitalist globalization (72--73). It offers, alternatively, an “uncanny”, “defamiliarized”, “preemergent”, “(im)possibl[e]” view of what life on Earth could become (74, 77, 80, 72). Gilroy -- who similarly considers the development of planetary humanism to be contingent upon the experience of “estrangement from one’s own culture and history” (2005, 67) -- connects the development of planetary humanism to “a deliberate engagement with the twentieth century’s histories of suffering” in order to “furnish resources for the peaceful accommodation of otherness in relation to fundamental commonality” (4). Gilroy describes this fundamental commonality as part of a “cosmopolitan conviviality” (8), which can emerge, potentially, in multicultural societies that have worked through the racist suffering, violence, and damage historically produced by Empire (99). This historical reckoning by western imperial centres is, for Gilroy, an indispensable component of overcoming “postcolonial melancholia” toward the production of convivial multicultural relations (98-- 106). It is the kind of historical reckoning the doors in Exit West produce by force; and the convivial life and planetary potential that unfolds as a result of ordinary encounters with otherness -- as demonstrated in Mykonos, London, and Marin County -- is the kind of common cosmopolitanism Gilroy envisions (67).

Mohsin Hamid’s Exit West -- like numerous other, formally experimental works of anticolonial or postcolonial fiction -- provides an imaginative cartography of the “what could happen if”. His speculative response in his speculative novel is “aspirational”, but it is neither impossible to achieve nor idealist in conception (Gandhi 2014, 165--166). To argue that fictional speculation can play no role in realpolitik is to foreclose in advance a range of discursive responses that might, in practice, produce more ethical outcomes than those that have unravelled in recent years. To argue that fictional speculation is idealist betrays a reductive understanding of what constitutes materiality.18 As Hamid’s novel so vividly illustrates, it is the imagined made real -- by way of human connection, overlapping experiences, common causes -- that makes possible responses other than fear and outcomes not automatically violent. The ahimsaic counter-askesis of Hamid’s novel of migratory passage unfolds an inclusionary ethics of “live and let live” rather than the exclusionary dogma of “kill or be killed”, currently driving so many global antagonisms. A global politics informed by Hamid’s fictional experiments may prove messy at first, difficult to coordinate or even to stomach. But, ultimately, it may produce the kind of inhabitants who, at the very least, work together soberly to ensure the sustainability of the planet we all share in common and without which we become extinct.

### 1NC — AT: Peterson

#### Limiting global solidarity to the experiences of a privileged academic in the US creates a litany of impacts that turn the aff

**Okoth 20** – (Kevin Ochieng Okoth, MPhil in Political Theory from the University of Oxford; “The Flatness of Blackness: Afro-Pessimism and the Erasure of Anti-Colonial Thought”; Salvage; D.A. August 31st 2020, [Published January 16th 2020]; <https://salvage.zone/issue-seven/the-flatness-of-blackness-afro-pessimism-and-the-erasure-of-anti-colonial-thought/>) [NOTE—‘AP’ = Afro-pessimism]

II. The Flatness of Blackness

Afro-pessimism in this original sense has reflected a disastrous approach to, and had disastrous consequences for Africa and its inhabitants. So how can we understand the bizarre use of this historically loaded term (complete with its own history of colonial and imperialist exploitation) by numerous African-American intellectuals and activists? The use of the term ‘Afro-pessimism’ is symptomatic of the historical ignorance of the Afro-pessimist™ (or what Greg Thomas has recently called Afro-pessimism 2.0), whose grasp of African history is about as solid as that of Hegel. In its initial iteration, Afro-pessimism 2.0 (from now on AP™) is a product of middle-class academia; a framework either consciously or subconsciously created to allow relatively well-off academics to view themselves as the most discriminated and oppressed people in the world. Characterised by misinterpretations and clever appropriations of Black radicals like Frantz Fanon and Silvia Wynter, the theories of the AP™ have spilled over into activist circles, contaminating the global political discourse on race.

The central premise of the AP™ is that anti-Black violence is the structuring regime of the modern world. Drawing on Orlando Patterson’s concept of ‘social death’, Frank Wilderson, arguably the most prominent and controversial AP™ intellectual, asserts that the Black condition is not characterised by oppression or exploitation, like that of the Marxist proletariat or the (neo)colonial subject, but rather by the distinction between the Human and the Slave. For Wilderson, the Black is a priori a slave and therefore we cannot speak of Blackness without reference to the Slaveness that constitutes it on an ontological level. In his essay ‘Ante-Anti-Blackness: Afterthoughts’, fellow University of California professor Jared Sexton argues that the condition of the Black/Slave is a state of total powerlessness, natal alienation (‘the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations’) and generalised dishonour. In short, Black existence is an ontological absence of sorts, and the Black/Slave is a living dead (non-entity) in the modern world.

In ‘The Black Liberation Army and the Paradox of Political Engagement’, Wilderson offers some further meditations on the concept of ‘social death’, explaining that ‘the point of social death is a condition, void, not of land, but of a capacity to secure relational status through transindividual objects – be those objects elaborated by land, labour or love’. Unlike colonial racisms perpetuated by the rational systems of white supremacy, neo-colonialism or imperialism, or women’s oppression and exploitation driven by patriarchy and capitalism’s need for reproductive labour, anti-Black violence is humanity’s irrational desire for violence against Black people. As Wilderson declares in an interview with C. S. Soong, ‘violence against Black people is a mechanism for the usurpation of subjectivity, of life of being’. What settlers wanted from Indians is land, so they killed Indians ‘in the main’ to get it, whereas what non-Blacks want from Blacks is not land but ‘being’. Anti-Blackness is thus qualitatively different from the regimes of violence that affect the Marxist proletariat; or the non-Black person of colour; or the non-Black woman; or the non-Black woman of colour; or (as Wilderson has famously claimed) Palestinians. Black suffering is incomparable and unique: to speak of any experience of oppression without reference to the ontological disparities between Black/non-Black people is ultimately an act of ‘anti-Blackness’. But what exactly is it about the makeup of modern society that displaces the Black/Slave from the realm of politics and precludes the articulation of concrete political demands? For Wilderson and Sexton, the very foundations of political discourse are inherently anti-Black. Or, to put it in terms of Giorgio Agamben’s political ontology (of which the AP™ are rather fond), the political – i.e. the ontological character of a political situation that separates it from other social actions – or what he calls ‘the Symbolic Order’, is skewed against the Black/Slave. The Symbolic Order is based on the recognition of the ‘other’s’ humanity, which then enables this ‘other’ to challenge the order on the grounds of, for instance, political economy. Since the Black is a priori a Slave, and Blackness and Slaveness are coterminous, the Black/Slave cannot participate in the Symbolic Order as her status is not that of the Human. And because the category of humanity is founded and relies on the existence of the slave, there is no way the Black/Slave can ever gain the recognition required to assert political demands and identities in the realm of the Symbolic Order. It is for this reason that, as Sexton points out in his essay ‘The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism’, we must posit a ‘political ontology dividing the Slave from the world of the Human in a constitutive way’ and take this as our analytical starting point. Wilderson’s and Sexton’s work contributes to a wider debate on the nature of Black studies in the United States, which is frequently tied into discussions on Black performance art, evidenced by the titles of Wilderson’s Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms, Kara Keeling’s The Witch’s Flight: The Cinematic, the Black Femme, and the Image of Common Sense or Fred Moten’s essays on Black Operations/Black Optimism in musical performance. Despite various disagreements and differences among these scholars, they are united by the common interest in ‘the afterlife of slavery’ – first described by Saidiya Hartman in her 2006 memoir Lose Your Mother. For Hartman – whose project is not that of AP™ and should not be mistaken for this essay’s target – official abolition in the United States did not engender a decisive break with the racialised violence of slavery; in contemporary society, we can see traces of such violence in the ‘skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment’ of African-Americans. The ‘afterlife of slavery’ she describes constitutes Black studies’ object, and loosely ties a range of scholars together into a coherent discourse. It is worth briefly considering Fred Moten’s work to understand the AP™’s ability to co-opt or usurp other approaches to Black Studies and activism. Moten attempted to counter the AP™ conception of social death by foregrounding Black agency and asserting that it is ontologically prior to the all-encompassing anti-Blackness of the modern world. In the unpublished paper ‘Black Optimism/Black Operation’, Moten attempts to counter the ‘anti-essentialism’ of radical discourses that disavow Black studies’ own object i.e. Blackness. For Moten, this Blackness exists in what he (along with his frequent collaborator Stefano Harney) has famously called ‘the undercommons’ – a space outside of official social structures, where Black people can assert their ‘right to refuse’. But as Annie Olaloku-Teriba points out in her excellent critique ‘Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness’, the AP™ finds a ‘comfortable antagonist’ in Moten, whose Black Ops can be neatly reintegrated into the concept of social death. It is also telling that Sexton, in ‘Ante-Anti-Blackness’, rather successfully merges the AP™ conception of social death with Moten’s Black Ops by arguing that: A living death is as much a death as it is living. Nothing in Afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonised, of all the things that capital has in common with labour – the modern world system. Sexton shows that Moten’s Black Ops is nothing other than what he instead calls ‘the social life of social death’. There is no either/or distinction between social life and social death: we can think both together by positing that Black life is lived in the underground. Moten even acknowledges, in ‘Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)’, that the AP™ and Black Ops are engaged in the same theoretical project: In the end, though life and optimism are the terms under which I speak, I agree with Sexton – by way of the slightest most immeasurable reversal of emphasis – that Afro-pessimism and black optimism are not but nothing other than one another. I will continue to prefer the black optimism of his work just as, I am sure, he will continue to prefer the Afro-pessimism of mine. For both Afro-pessimists and Black Optimists, the afterlife of slavery is characterised by the social death of the Black/Slave and a heavily distorted version of Fanon’s concept of the ‘fact of blackness’. This assumption, however, precludes the participation of Black Ops in radical politics and confines resistance to spaces of Black performance art.

By confining Black resistance to spaces outside of the anti-Black structures of civil society, and by undercutting the possibility for anti-imperialist solidarity between racialised people across the world, the AP™ theories have opened up a space for the corporate capture of Blackness. We need only recall last year’s Nike campaign, prominently featuring the face of former NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick, who has been blackballed by the league for kneeling during the national anthem. Since the incident, he has taken on the role of radical Black activist, complete with Panther-esque leather jackets, an afro and Afrocentric jewellery. While Kaepernick’s struggle against the racist and exploitative NFL owners and executives is, of course, legitimate and necessary, the co-optation of his struggle by a large corporation is certainly a cause for concern. Nike is notorious for its use of sweatshop labour (including both forced and child labour), and its history of exploitative labour practices has been well-documented throughout the years. By detaching the struggles of African-Americans from those of racialised workers in the Global South, Nike can present itself as a progressive vehicle for Black emancipatory politics, while completely sidelining the plight of non-white workers outside of the US. Here we might recall a powerful statement by Fred Hampton to illustrate just how far from revolutionary Black politics we find ourselves:

We don’t think you fight fire with fire best; we think you fight fire with water best. We’re going to fight racism not with racism, but we’re going to fight with solidarity. We say we’re not going to fight capitalism with black capitalism, but we’re going to fight it with socialism […] We’re going to fight […] with all of us people getting together and having an international proletarian revolution.

Wilderson and Sexton have been captured by corporate interests in much the same way. In their case, however, it is not a large corporation that co-opts Blackness, but rather the neoliberal university. Is it at all surprising that two professors working within the prestigious University of California system promote a theoretical framework that requires no political action from Black writers and activists other than simply being Black? Not only is AP™ a product of the neoliberal university, it also promotes its authors survival and flourishing within the corporate structures of higher education. When asked about his framework for psychological and physical resistance by the hosts of iMiXWHATiLiKE, Wilderson neatly dodges any commitment to radical politics with the excuse that it could cost him his academic job.

This is so much a part of what it means to be a professor. I feel like cussing people out all the time. But if I do, I violate University of California’s civility laws, tenure or not I’m out the door, right? And that tempers my speech. So, I think that what I have to offer is not a way out. What I have to offer is an analysis of the problem. And I don’t trust me as much as I trust Black people on the ground.

Wilderson is aware that the AP™ rely on their activist supporters and social media following to maintain their privileged position within the university – without the activists and organisers on the ground, the AP™ could not prove the market value of its work to the neoliberal institution. By creating a framework for the analysis of race that lends itself to co-optation by corporate interests, the AP™ has certainly demonstrated that it can convert Blackness into profit. All the while, these theorists delude themselves that they are spearheading a truly radical Black movement. In the introduction to a collection of essays on AP™, the editors (who presumably include Sexton and Wilderson) even have the audacity to claim that they are ‘motivated by a desire to contribute to […] bringing these writings out of the ivory towers of the academy’ and that they wish to ‘remove the materials from this sitting place and see them proliferate among those in the streets and prisons’. True, they have succeeded in disseminating a watered-down version of their musings to activists and organisers; but what they have passed on is nothing short of anti-Black, in the sense that it works against the true liberation of Black people of all classes.

Today, such Blackness (and the pseudo-politics that is attached to it) is more useful for academic promotions, Instagram hashtags, and Nike adverts than for any revolutionary or emancipatory politics worthy of the name. The people who truly benefit – or rather profit – from the AP™ brand are the academics and the various university presses and journals who jump at every opportunity to unleash a plethora of AP™ books and articles onto the academic book market. While the AP™ may seem like a niche theoretical discourse, its influence extends far beyond the university: as Olaloku-Teriba argues, the AP™’s theoretical framework provides ‘the structuring logic of various political formations in the era of #BlackLivesMatter’. What is at stake in the debate, therefore, is nothing less than the possibility of a revolutionary Black politics. Maybe African-Americans on the streets or in prison would do well to reach for George Jackson’s Soledad Brother and steer clear of the AP™ and Black Ops.

III. The Afterlives of Slavery

The retreat of the AP™ and Black Ops from politics poses a problem for activists and scholars looking to engage in struggles that take seriously the political economy of race and the need for cross-racial solidarity. But how have these key themes of radical Black movements from the 1960s and 70s – from the Black Panthers to African anti-colonial struggles –  disappeared in the AP™’s theories? The erasure of radical Black and anti-colonial struggles rests almost entirely on misreading – or in some cases not reading – Marxist contributions to the study of race, colonialism and slavery. And this unfounded dismissal of the entire Marxist tradition allows the AP™ to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, it can position itself as a radical critique of Eurocentric left discourses. On the other hand, it allows the AP™ to disregard a vast body of Marxist scholarship that has ‘raced’ the history of capitalism and developed a nuanced analysis of the relationship between New World Slavery and capitalist accumulation on a global scale. Thus, the AP™ can ignore the specificities of how different Black populations are racialised and displace the study of political economy (and particularly of imperialism) in favour of ontological questions.

In the interview ‘We’re trying to destroy the world: Anti-Blackness & Police Violence after Ferguson’ Wilderson makes the bizarre claim that ‘slaveness is something that has consumed Blackness and Africanness, making it impossible to divide slavery from Blackness’. If this assumption sounds familiar, look no further than the Afro-pessimism of old, with its conflation of Africanness and Blackness and its disregard for the African continent and its inhabitants. But how has an approach that attempts to grapple with the complexities of Black being ended up rehashing the same assumptions and prejudices of Eurocentric discourse designed to dehumanise Black people on the African continent in the first place? The AP™’s theoretical position is riddled with contradictions: how can Blackness be separated from white supremacy, neocolonialism or imperialism and women’s reproductive labour, when these are the mechanisms that structure the quotidien experience of most people racialised as Black on a global scale? Moreover, if the Black/Slave exists in a state of powerlessness and natal alienation – characterised by the loss of ties of birth in ascending and descending generations – how do we theorise the Blackness of those whose ancestors remained in Africa throughout the translatlantic slave trade? Skimming the AP™’s bibliographies, one can be forgiven for thinking that the sheer number of references to radical scholarship reflects a close reading and consideration of the texts and arguments in question. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In ‘The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy’, Steve Martinot and Jared Sexton claim that Marxist approaches treat racism as merely a divide-and-conquer strategy for class struggle and super exploitation, and that Marxists fail to understand that racism – and anti-Blackness in particular – is not an ideology that can be refuted but is rather ‘fundamental to class relations themselves’. Wilderson’s ‘Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society’ advances a similar critique, arguing that the Black/Slave poses an insoluble problem for the Gramscian discourse on race, since it is not wage labour exploitation but ‘the despotism of the unwaged relation’ that drives anti-Black racism. For Wilderson, this discourse fails to think anything other than capitalism as the ‘base’ structure, from which other superstructural phenomena such as racism emerge. Marxists have thus failed to recognise that ‘Capital was kick-started by the rape of the African continent’ and that it is ‘as close to capital’s primal desire than is exploitation’. The Black/Slave blows apart key assumptions in Marxist thought, which renders it useless to for the analysis of the afterlife of slavery; this is the ‘scandal of historical materialism’. But Wilderson’s and Sexton’s critique of Marxism is shallow at best. In volume one of Capital, Marx clearly states that ‘the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins’ signalled ‘the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production’. In a letter to Russian literary critic Pavel Vasilyyevich Annenkov, Marx also writes that: We are not dealing here with indirect slavery, the slavery of the proletariat, we are dealing with direct slavery, the slavery of Blacks in Surinam, in Brazil, in the southern states of North America Marx makes a clear distinction between slave labour and wage labour, refusing to conflate both in the category of the proletarian. In the specific case of the United States, he believed that the worker’s movements had been paralysed by the existence of slave labour and their inability to adequately address it. In Capital, he writes, ‘labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin.’ The possibility of a unified proletarian revolution thus relies on the abolition of slavery. While this may sound as if Marx’ is theorising race as merely a divide and conquer strategy, as many critics have accused him of doing, there is an entire discourse within Marxism that has taken seriously the role that the racial plays in structuring social formations in the Americas. Instead of going back to what Marx did or didn’t say about slavery, however, it may be more constructive to ask in what ways transatlantic slavery forces us to rethink the fundamental categories of Marxist political economy. Robin Blackburn’s historical studies of the transatlantic slave trade offer a more nuanced perspective that is entirely at odds with the strawman Marxism of the AP™. Blackburn acknowledges that New World slavery was more than just a divide and conquer strategy; it represented an intensification and racialisation of prior forms of slavery. Like early African or Roman slavery, chattel slavery was based on the idea that a person could be bought and sold. But unlike previous techniques, the New World version institutionalised slavery and made it hereditary. Once a person had been enslaved, it was highly likely that their descendants would continue to exist in a relation of bondage. Where Blackburn’s analysis diverges from the AP™ is in his emphasis on the interrelation between slavery, colonialism and capitalism, and his efforts to understand how the racial structures the mode of production in each instance. For Blackburn, New World slavery was a central product of the rise of capitalism, not of an a priori anti-Blackness, and therefore cannot be neatly be separated from the early stages of capitalist accumulation and the violent expansion of European (early Spanish and Portuguese as well as later British) colonialism in Africa, Asia and the Americas. As Greg Thomas argues in ‘Afro-Blue Notes’, Walter Rodney already recognised this, in ‘Slavery and Underdevelopment’ and ‘Plantation Society in Guyana’, when he showed that plantation slavery in America is colonial slavery. In short, ‘there is no system of slavery in any part of these Americas that is not still settler colonial slavery; no settler colonialism without chattel slavery or racial slavery and their neo-slaveries’, Blackburn and other radical historians of slavery draw on Cedric Robinson’s concept of ‘racial capitalism’, which can be used to refute the claim that slaveness and Africanness are one and the same. In Black Marxism Robinson argues that racism was already present in Western civilisation prior to the flourishing of capitalism. Thus, capitalism and racism grew together from the old order to produce the ‘racial capitalism’ characteristic of the modern world; a new world system relying on slavery, violence, imperialism and genocide for its continued expansion. The value of Robinson’s work lies in its ability to uncover the contingent relationship between slavery and Blackness: he argues that early European proletarians were racialised subjects from oppressed groups, such as the Irish, Jews, Roma or Slavs, who were victims of dispossession, colonialism and slavery within Europe. With the dawn of the transatlantic slave trade, new notions of difference emerged, based on more aggressively racialised conceptions, that were used to justify the political economy of slavery. For Robinson, white supremacy masked itself as an economic rationale, which in turn organised racial hierarchies, with the production of cotton at its core. As Chris Chen writes in ‘The Limit Points of Capitalist Equality’, the colonial and racial genealogy of European capitalism’ were ‘encoded directly into the economic “base” through an ongoing history of racial violence which […] binds surplus populations to capitalist markets.

There are also several surprising omissions in the AP™ account of slavery that point towards its entrenched African-American exceptionalism, most notably that of the slave trade in the Americas more broadly. Although the African-American experience of chattel slavery is overrepresented in the AP™ narrative, only about 4 per cent of all enslaved Africans, out of over 10 million that were taken to the Americas between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, were carried to North America. Close to five million enslaved Africans were taken to Portuguese America (Brazil) alone between 1501 and 1866, and whose labour became the driving force for the sugar economy in the early 1600s, and gold and diamond mining from about 1690 onwards. While the AP™ continue to structure their analysis of Blackness and slaveness around the official abolition of slavery in the United States in 1865, they seem to forget that slavery wasn’t abolished in Brazil until 1888. But in the AP™’s ‘afterlife of slavery’, these histories don’t play any role. The legacy of US chattel slavery consumes all Black experience, both historical and contemporary.

If the AP™ were to pay attention to the peculiarities of Brazilian slavery, it would have to adapt its concept of Blackness to develop an account of how race has structured a social formation with the second largest Black population in the world. In Nigeria, the country with the world’s largest Black population, the ‘afterlife of slavery’ takes on a completely different meaning than in the US. While slavery had existed in Igbo society before colonisation, it accelerated with the increasing demand for slaves on the other side of the Atlantic. When slavery was officially abolished in many parts of the West, Adiele Afigbo writes in The Abolition of the Slave Trade in Southeastern Nigeria, 1885–1950, Igbo slave markets were flooded with ohu and osu slaves, whose descendants to this day retain the stigma of their ancestors – they cannot intermarry with freeborn and are excluded from important community organisations. In a recent New Yorker article Nigerian novelist Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani argues that:

Igbo discrimination is not based on race, and there are no visual markers to differentiate slave descendants from freeborn. Instead, it trades on cultural beliefs about lineage and spirituality.

Discrimination of slave descendants is thus based on their role as outsiders, since the ohu have never really lost their outsider status in a society where community ties are extremely important. Afigbo’s periodisation also points to another important aspect of slavery in Nigeria: it was only officially abolished by the British in the early 1900s but continued informally for at least another forty to fifty years. What this means is that we cannot understand slavery in Nigeria within the Igbo system with reference to an African-American concept of race, conditioned entirely by the experiences of US chattel slavery. For the descendants of ohu slaves, the afterlife of slavery is not characterised by the condition of the Black/Slave but rather by something quite different. In this case, the equation of the Black/Slave with the African does not hold.

### 1NC — Activism

#### Supporting the efforts of grass roots organizations to challenge corporate monopoly is critical to spur and assist movements fighting a host of racial injustices

Greer & Rice 21 Jeremie Greer and Solana Rice are the co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation, a national movement-support organization working to build the power of people of color to totally transform the economy. , ANTI-MONOPOLY ACTIVISM Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice, <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>

Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities. To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48

### 1NC — AT: Moten and Harney

#### Double bind — either the system of logistics overaccumulates and collapses over its contradictions OR logistical expansion is inevitable — nation states, aid organizations and social movements embrace it now. BUT, their attempts to resist logistics gets co-opted and only feeds into its power

Chua et al. 18 (Charmaine Chua is Assistant Professor in the Department of Global Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research and teaching interests are in technologies of globalization, global political economy, infrastructure studies, empire and imperialism, and ocean studies. Martin Danyluk is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Nottingham. He was a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of British Columbia, completed his PhD (2017) in geography and MSc (2009) in urban planning at the University of Toronto. Deborah Cowen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto. Laleh Khalili is a Professor of International Politics at Queen Mary University of London. “Introduction: Turbulent Circulation: Building a Critical Engagement with Logistics, “Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,” Vol. 36(4), pgs 617–629. doi:10.1177/0263775818783101, <https://www.academia.edu/37193789/Introduction_Turbulent_Circulation_Building_a_Critical_Engagement_with_Logistics>) DIO

The state plays a crucial role in processes of logistical expansion (see Orenstein, 2018). Because both accumulation and war occur in and through space, capitalist states mobilize space as a productive (or destructive) force through strategies of spatial planning, infrastructural investment, and industrial policy. Nations and cities now compete on the basis of strategies to optimize logistics and transportation performance, frequently subordinating democratic principles and the welfare of populations to the needs of supply-chain expansion (see Ziadah, 2018). Danyluk, in this issue, notes how developments in logistics have served as a basis for large-scale state investment in transportation infrastructures, like ports, canals, and railways. The rise of logistics has also reworked the international division of labor and reframed questions of worker strategy. Cheap and rapid methods of commodity circulation have promoted the consolidation of new patterns of sociospatial inequality at the global scale. As Tsing (2009) has argued, the development of integrated transnational supply chains has enabled capital to exploit differences among workforces in different parts of the world, creating new regimes of labor containment and fragmentation based on ostensibly noneconomic features of identity (race, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship status, etc.). For labor, confronting these challenges will require forging new coalitions and developing creative strategies for organizing across distance. Yet logistical space is also riven with contradictions and constantly faced with the real and potential catastrophes posed by “gigantic breakdowns and stoppages” (Mumford, 1961: 544). As Rossiter, 2014 reminds us, the ambitions of logistics are ultimately “operational 622 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 36(4) fantasies” (2014: 54) that rely on, even as they aim to contain, a recalcitrant polity through calculative forms of domination and repression. As such, we should be careful not to reify logistics as a seamless system of instantaneous flow and total functional integration. By paying attention to the frictions and stoppages that are part and parcel of logistical processes, critical scholars have noted that even as logistics is taken up as a tool of imperial dispossession and capitalist power, it also produces new sites of vulnerability and potential emancipation. To this end, logistics has become a growing force not only among states, corporations, military forces, and aid organizations but also within social movements and activist organizations that aim to challenge their practice. Beyond the accidental breakdowns and stoppages that threaten just-in-time supply chains are more deliberate efforts to interrupt the circulation of violence and remake environmentally and socially just forms of provisioning and sustaining**.** A critical engagement with logistics is a feature not simply of academic practice but of intellectual, political, and practical organizing across various sectors of work and arenas of contestation. These efforts are clearly not brand new—not only in the transportation sector, where workers have long struggled over their conditions of work, but in myriad movements that have worked to sustain themselves over time, including through uprisings, occupations, and revolutions. As logistics has ascended to a place of prominence in the organization of war and trade globally, it has also become subject to new frequencies and forms of contestation. Alberto Toscano (2014) highlights this shift when he asks, “Can we define or declare a relocation of political and class conflict, in the overdeveloped de-industrializing countries of the ‘Global North,’ from the point of production to the chokepoints of circulation?” Such an approach centers sites of physical circulation as pressure points where mass movements can contest the violence of state and capital, signaling a shift in tactics from the withdrawal of productive labor power to disruptive blockades and sabotage along the arteries of trade (Clover, 2016; Degenerate Communism, 2014; Oakland Commune, 2011). A scholarly discourse has emerged under the banner of “counterlogistics” that engages labor, anticolonial, and antiracist struggles (Bernes, 2013; Chua et al., 2016; Fox-Hodess, 2017). We might also trace a growing reliance on a critical practice that explicitly names the field: logistics groups, tents, and committees are now a mainstay of radical organizing, pointing to the possible repurposing of logistical models as sources of care

MARKED

and social reproduction (Armstrong, 2015; Cowen, 2014; Crashnburn, 2014). As Attewell (2018) argues in this issue, initiatives like the US Agency for International Development’s Commodity Export Program “contain within them the germ of a different kind of logistics: one that preserves its will to care, while dispensing with its necropolitical baggage” (735). In this vein, one fertile arena for future research is to examine more expansive possibilities for counterlogistics—asking, following Toscano (2014), “What happens then if we consider the question of circulation less literally? And what would it mean to struggle not simply against material flows but against the social forms that channel them?” By focusing on the social relations that underpin logistical processes, critical engagements with logistics might be productively nudged towards more emancipatory political ends by exploring how counterlogistical contestation is being waged not only in the sectors we might immediately associate with goods circulation but so too in the broader social relations of logistical society. Yet we should be careful not to fetishize counterlogistical projects without a firm grasp on how the state and capital are invested in controlling the spaces of stocks and flows. Attempts at resisting or disrupting circulation can be co-opted, contained, or absorbed—in the construction of redundant container shipping networks, for example, which give corporations multiple options for rerouting cargo around traffic bottlenecks or restive labor forces. Further, as Timothy Mitchell (2011: chap. 1) and Dara Orenstein (2018) have Chua et al. 623 shown, tactics of sabotage and disruption have themselves become integral to processes of value realization, where capital’s power rests not only in speeding up circulation but also in the capacity to slow it down. More broadly, while the growing prominence of “circulation struggles” (Clover, 2016) presents rich ground for scholarly exploration and political organizing, there is a danger in fetishizing the tactics of material interruption per se. More important than the form of political resistance are its contents, the concrete social relations in which it is embedded and that it seeks to transform. As Chua (2017: 165) argues, “even if material structures are constitutive of the extant political order,” the act of disrupting or sabotaging material flows alone is not enough to reconfigure logistics: “circulation struggles can only have revolutionary potential if collective power is politically mobilized across the supply chain.” Logistical systems increasingly encroach on everyday life under the justification that rapid, efficient circulation is necessary to the welfare of the economy, the state, and its people. Yet, as both a calculative rationality and a practice of spatial ordering, mainstream iterations of logistics work to promote the accumulation of capital and state power in ways that exacerbate existing inequalities and produce new dispositions of life and death (see Attewell, 2018). The articles collected in this issue point to the myriad ways these apparatuses also distribute inequality, immiseration, and “vulnerability to premature death” (Gilmore, 2007: 28). At the same time, the gap between the idealized imagination of logistics and its messy implementation reveals that the project of making the world safe for circulation is always incomplete. A critical engagement with logistics attends to the struggles, social conflicts, and tensions that can never be excised from global flows. This liveliness of logistics is one aspect that comes to the fore in this theme issue. Interrogating the multiple, varied, and contested lives of logistics brings into focus the violence committed in its name, the vulnerabilities of its networks, and the political possibilities latent in its present-day forms.

### 1NC — Debate

#### Debate should be a site for role experimentation which promotes contesting the consequences of imagined policy proposals. Their radical refusal of state engagement precludes the micro-political fissure-making necessary to challenge the logic of capital and create political change.

Yee 15—futurist, business strategist and freelance writer (Aubrey, “The Fragility of Things and Capacities of the Micro-Political Experiment”, Theory & Event Volume 18, Issue 3, 2015, dml)

To escape the crocodile death roll of modernity thus requires the calm serenity of fluid movement paired with the speed of instinct and reaction. Such instinctual reaction in the face of certain death can only be born of militant and repetitive practice until the reaction is finally, purely instinctual. Like the surfer who survives a wipe-out on a 100’ wave, the calm that allows your body to go limp and ride out the excruciating minutes of chaotic tumbling and lack of air can only come from a thoroughly practiced and steady mind. Finding joy and purpose in political practice becomes critical to the longevity and intensity of commitment. In words frequently attributed to him, Gary Sirota explains why he surfs: “There are no more committed people on the planet than surfers. We fall down a lot. We turn around, paddle back out, and do it over and over again.”9 In this same way, we must become addicted to the high of engagement. The accumulation of political role experimentations espoused by Connolly become a path for amplifying connection and perception and as each experiment makes a small difference, the natural amplification of effects “may prepare us to participate with others in yet more adventurous activities” that counteract the insistent amplification of neoliberal ideological forces.10 In this prescription, as we learn to surf the ceaseless waves of climate change, species loss, socio-economic inequality, refugees, war, surveillance and depression, we find the moments of joy and connection in the work that keep us coming back, each time more prepared and capable of surfing bigger waves with confidence.

To begin cultivating the necessary qualities, Connolly’s imagination of the ‘micro’ is instrumental. He argues that, “Capitalism writ large… sets too large and generic a target…The point today is not to wait for a revolution that overthrows the whole system.”11 To reinforce this hypothesis, Connolly connects his vision of a vigilant micro-political commitment to our daily entanglement with the microbiota within and all around us, “because human and nonhuman systems regularly infuse and impinge upon one another – both at the microscopic level within human bodies and at the macroscopic level between disparate systems.”12 We can see this phenomena manifested clearly with the increasing prevalence of Toxoplasma gondii, an intracellular parasitic protozoan typically found in cat poo and implicated in a whole host of disorders perhaps most notably and symbolically schizophrenia.13 Or in the way that a newborn child is robbed of their very first protective microbial force field when birthed by caesarean, a trend reaching upwards of 40 percent in some countries like Chile.14 These and myriad other micro-biological processes remind us daily that “We are not unique; we are merely distinctive.”15 Embracing that level of humility is crucial as we are forced to evolve rapidly and transformatively in a not-so-distant future filled with environmental wierding, socio-economic upheavals and chaotic technological advances all underwritten by a neoliberal world order. Humility, in this post-normal world becomes an invaluable asset, allowing us to productively accept, understand and enhance our positively parasitic partnership with unseen micro-realities rather than becoming mired in the ego-ic experience of neoliberal individualism. Community is today more critical, and in fact more endangered, than it has ever been. The realities that a parasite could induce delusions of grandeur in the human mind, and that commodification of health has led to children entering the world devoid of their first microbial allies are significant for our understandings of modern neoliberal politics. “Capitalist modes of acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the fragility of things today also generate pressures to minoritize the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace that heretofore.”16 Reversing this neoliberal tendency to loosen beings from their connection to the web of existence is the work of our time. Rebuilding our ability to sense connection and resonance when it occurs, to hear our na’au when it speaks to us in new languages, these are our challenges and our calling.

Connolly mirrors and re-resonates this value for micro-processes in his evaluation of political will. By positioning role performance as political experiment, Connolly subtly argues for the microbial infection and amplification of day-to-day activity, indicating that small deliberate choices can lead to entrenched behaviors much in the same way that ingestion of the toxoplasma microbe can eventually lead to schizophrenia. He clearly argues that “role experimentations and the shape of the pluralist assemblage thus infect one another.”17 To ignore the tacit role performances with which we engage constantly is to then succumb to the habitual nature of practices that “condense previous relations of overt power.”18 Instead, we are being asked by the inherent fragility of things to intentionally foster micro-political-performances that enhance our militant democratic possibilities. Coincidentally these same performances will likely be the ones that inspire the most joy within us; a joy that creates a space for us to persist and practice despite a mounting understanding of catastrophe. Whether it is a small group of scholars gathering to discuss the fragility of things, or a blog one of us writes later to critique neoliberal ideologies, or a smile given to a stranger in a crowded public space, or a garden, planted in an abandoned city lot to grow food and feed a neighborhood, these microscopic daily acts of political will reaffirm that “there is no zone of complete neutrality in a world of role performances” and that there are “significant relays between role performance, self-identity, and the formation of larger political constellations.”19 In the same way that we are constantly made and re-made by the microbial biological realities at work within our bodies, our politics are constantly made and re-made by the micro-political choices and identifications we collectively propagate.

And yet, despite this insistence on micro-political performativity, there is an equally urgent call to reengage with the state as a site of activism. Treading lightly in his prescriptions, Connolly is nonetheless explicit in his concern for the mounting pressures to discard the state altogether. Instead, he explains that, “the fragile ecology of late capital requires state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets.”20 The scale of the challenges we face and their planetary ubiquity require state intervention as much as they require the resonance of community based micro-politics. We need a revolution at all scales to reverse the trends that have brought us a world where small island nations are being swallowed by a rising ocean; a world where many say the sixth extinction is already underway;

MARKED

a world where most Americans have little or no connection to most of their closest neighbors. The severity and ubiquity of the crisis demands an equal amount of amplification and resonance from the other side of the pendulum and this will only come if we engage “a multisited politics designed to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life.”21

The political economy of late-late capitalism is a moving assemblage – its loose joints and disparate edges tearing at the fragile fabric of communities in the midst of their struggle to hold a center. And we must become painfully aware, if we have not already, that in this day and age, the very notion of community and the heterogeneity that deeply place-based community cultivates is under heated attack from many sides. This is the fate of our neoliberal embrace, for as Connolly suggests, “neoliberalism is a form of biopolitics that seeks to produce a nation of regular individuals, even as its proponents often act as if they are merely describing processes that are automatic and individual behavior that is free.”22 This is perhaps the ultimate deception of the Anthropocene epoch and a delusion that could very well be our undoing. Participation in this delusion is partially a survival instinct, “since total immersion in the dangers of the future and the contemporary condition can lead you to neglect daily duties and needs.”23 These realities coalesce to form an ever-greater argument for the capacity of micro-processes as change agents. Harnessing the “potential power of these subterranean flows” will allow us the fortitude to continue persisting in a world entrenched in neoliberal schizophrenia while simultaneously building the capacity for self-organization and feedback loops that allow “a self-amplification system to emerge”, what Connolly calls a “creative resonance machine” – one to counter and unbalance the machine that is literally consuming the planet and all its natural resources.24 This resonance machine would have micro-political communities forming in various places around the world which would then find connections among one another to build ever-greater alliances that en masse have the potential to enact Connolly’s vision of the militant politics that are necessary to “defeat neoliberalism, to curtail climate change, to reduce inequality, and to instill a vibrant pluralist spirituality into democratic machines that have lost too much of their vitality.”25 In the short term at least, it seems that we still very much need the institutions of the state as final safe guards against the pervasive and divisive individuality that neoliberalism would have us believe is paramount to freedom.

It is then within this call to role performance as political experiment that I believe Connolly offers us a compelling way forward. Imagining our daily micro political maneuvers as part of a larger resonance machine embroiled in the best that a complex universe has to offer is the only way we may find the fortitude to relax our breath, conserve the last bits of oxygen we have left and ride the chaos of this massive wave until the set has passed and we find our way to the sky for a quick and critical breath. Remembering with calm confidence that another set of waves with equally chaotic power is very likely on its way. At our constant aid is the innate human appreciation for aesthetic experience. We may want to seriously consider the idea that aesthetics are in fact a basic and physiological form of communicating ethics between modes of existence such as living/non-living or human/non-human. Joseph Campbell called this ‘the problem of beauty,’ and in an interview with Bill Moyers he asked, “When a spider makes a beautiful web, the beauty comes out of the spider’s nature. It’s instinctive beauty. How much of the beauty of our own lives is about the beauty of being alive?”26 Re-instilling our ethical imaginary with this positioning allows for incorporation of both humility and reverence, two concepts critical to the task of managing our fragility. Cultivating our sensitivity to the inherent aesthetic communication of non-human beings and things requires specific courage in a world full of apparent suffering, but I believe that this courage is crucial and we can no longer afford to deny our complicity in the state of things as they are.

Where I disagree with Connolly is primarily in his assessment of thinking about and envisioning the future(s). Arguing for dedication to an ‘interim agenda,’ Connolly suggests that “in a world of becoming the more distant future is too cloudy to engage.”27 While this may be true on face value, the cloudiness of the more distant future must not preclude our engagement with it. Instead, at this point in history it is more crucial than ever to hone our capacity for engaging with uncertainty and becoming comfortable in the fog. It is through the repeated and consistent practice of imagining and envisioning preferred and alternative futures that we will polish and strengthen our capacity for performing militant and productive micro-politics in the present. The future is destined to be the artifact of those with the most militant imaginings and we cannot afford to forego that commitment for a focus solely on the interim present. Getting good at experiment is part of this process. In fact ethical experiment and resilience may be the words best suited to replace the outdated and misused meme of sustainability. Micropolitical experiment like microbial contagion will shape and reshape our path as we charge forward into an increasingly chaotic future in a “cosmos of becoming.”28

# 2NC

## T — USFG

#### **3 — There’s nothing violent about debating the res** — topicality isn’t policing

Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 (“Reply to My Critic(s),” *Criticism*, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)

Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"—that [End Page 285] is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police.

Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off:

Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument—roughly, Habermas's version—and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on—in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand.

Let's leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody else's hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak [End Page 286] about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

# 1NR

## Case

#### Anti-capitalist movements will fail without black participation

Ervin 16 Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin is an American writer, activist, and black anarchist. He is a former member of the Black Panther Party and Concerned Citizens for Justice, The Progressive Plantation: racism inside white radical social change groups<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/01/04/book-review-vulnerability-in-resistance-edited-by-judith-butler-zeynep-gambetti-and-leticia-sabsay/>

Clearly, there will not be any future labor or community victories that do not include Black and other non-white workers as a strategic force. Yet, the white Left, including regrettably some groups of Anarcho-Syndicalists and “Platformists,” still think that the white industrial workers are the vanguard for the revolution and that workers of color should just wait on them to move from their privileged positions. Now this is not just a matter of semantics, I have actually had them very distinctly tell me this. Yet, it is clear to me that they do not really understand how capitalism and white supremacy operate in America. Their theories were made for a time when white male workers dominated industry and the work force. The face of the American working class has changed however. For one thing there are more women working, along with more racial minorities and foreign-born workers than ever before. These workers of color are all subjected to oppression and exploitation on the dual grounds of race and class and thus have to ﬁght the extra battles against racism and discrimination. They are in labor unions, but also constitute the largest number of unemployed, homeless and underemployed and they are the largest number of unorganized workers.

#### Black Activism is essential to challenge capitalism

Ervin 16 Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin is an American writer, activist, and black anarchist. He is a former member of the Black Panther Party and Concerned Citizens for Justice, The Progressive Plantation: racism inside white radical social change groups<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/01/04/book-review-vulnerability-in-resistance-edited-by-judith-butler-zeynep-gambetti-and-leticia-sabsay/>

Of course, I still believe that the unity of Black/POC and white workers is indispensable to combat and overthrow the system of Capitalism. But where white workers are now privileged and Black workers are penalized in this society, Black and Latino unity and struggle must precede and prepare the ground for any possible unity with white workers on a broad scale. Further, a movement has to be built to ﬁght racism and capitalism now and not be afraid to challenge racism in the working class communities themselves. Not some romantic white-led movement that refuses to deal with these issues.

#### Black political activism for a $15 wage makes a huge impact on the daily lives of individuals

NELP 21 National Employment Law Project (July 21, 2021, FIGHT FOR $15 MOVEMENT HAS WON $150B IN WAGE RAISES FOR 26M WORKERS IN LESS THAN A DECADE, <https://www.nelp.org/news-releases/fight-for-15-movement-has-won-150b-in-wage-raises-for-26m-workers-in-less-than-a-decade/>)

The worker-of-color-led Fight for $15 and a union movement has won $150 billion in raises for 26 million workers to date, according to a new report from National Employment Law Project (NELP). Twelve million of the 26 million impacted workers (46 percent) are Black, Latinx, or Asian American; and of the $150 billion in total raises that workers have secured, $76 billion has gone to workers of color and $70 billion to women workers. New York City fast-food workers first walked off their jobs in November 2012, demanding a $15 minimum wage and union rights. Since then, the movement for higher wages has become one of the most successful workers’ movements in recent memory, leading to higher wages in dozens of states, cities, and counties; putting pressure on some of the world’s largest corporations to raise their pay scales; and transforming public opinion. “Since 2012, the Fight for $15 movement has brought together thousands of workers across the country, who organized and called for higher wages and union rights. Our report quantifies the impact of this movement in terms of the number of workers who have benefitted, and the higher earnings they have won,” says NELP Senior Researcher and Policy Analyst Yannet Lathrop, who co-authored the study along with San Jose State University Professor T. William Lester and University of North Carolina doctoral candidate Matthew Wilson. Lathrop continues: “What’s most impressive is that workers have won these wage increases despite every imaginable obstacle­—from a system increasingly stacked against workers and labor unions, to interference from some of the most nefarious corporations, who deployed well-paid lobbyists to fight tooth and nail against higher minimum wages. But workers won in the end. That should tell us that when workers organize, they win.” These massive wins—amounting to $5,700 in additional annual income per worker—have made a real material difference in the lives of the nation’s millions of underpaid workers and their families. The impact is particularly significant for workers of color—for example, the report finds that state minimum wage increases boosted the earnings of Black workers by $5,100 annually on average; and that local minimum wage increases raised their earnings by $7,300.